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POLICY BRIEF
German Council on Foreign Relations
An International  
Partnership for  
Sudan’s Transition: 
Mobilizing Support, 
Preventing Instability
Germany has helped lead efforts to mobilize international support  
for Sudan’s transition process since President al-Bashir was ousted  
last year. To be successful, Germany and its partners must deliver 
on their promises to support the transitional government’s economic  
reforms with substantial aid. They should keep Sudan’s diverse 
partners aligned while broadening their outreach. Sudan is thus a 
test case for how much political capital Germany will spend on its 
stated objective of conflict prevention.
Although Sudan’s transition process is a tremendous opportunity 
for sustainable peace and long-term democratic transformation, 
the collapse of the transitional government – resulting in a return to 
military rule and large-scale political violence – remains possible.
Currently, Sudan’s economic crisis represents the greatest danger  
to the transition process. Grievances resulting from spiraling 
inflation and increasing food insecurity undermine the domestic 
legitimacy of the transitional authorities.
Sudan’s transitional government has recently initiated important  
economic reforms, including a cash-transfer system to offset 
macroeconomic adjustments. Donors have long requested such 
groundwork before they mobilize further aid.
Germany should ensure that international support responds to 
the demands of Sudan’s vibrant civil society and is based on the 
expectation that the civil-military coalition government sticks  
to the 2019 constitutional declaration.
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Sudan’s transition process is one of 
the most important recent develop-
ments affecting peace and stability 
in the Horn of Africa.1 Well-organized 
grassroots protests led by women and 
youth resulted in the downfall of Pres-
ident Omar al-Bashir after thirty years 
of authoritarian rule in April 2019, when 
his own military toppled him. Asking for 
a civilian government, the protesters 
sustained demonstrations despite bru-
tal violence by security forces. In Au-
gust 2019, after mediation by Ethiopia 
and the African Union (AU), the gen-
erals agreed on a power-sharing deal 
with the civilian forces of civil society 
organizations and political parties rep-
resented by the Forces of Freedom and 
Change (FFC). Given close support for 
the security forces by Arab powers, the 
democratic transition in Sudan affects 
the larger geopolitical rivalry in the 
Middle East and East Africa.2
1  The text benefited from conversations with dozens of Sudanese and international interlocutors, including officials, 
activists, diplomats, and experts. I am especially thankful for repeated conversations with Wasil Ali, Jean-Baptiste 
Gallopin, Philipp Jahn, Peter Schumann, and Mahmoud Zainelabdeen.
2  Jean-Baptiste Gallopin, “The Great Game of the UAE and Saudi Arabia in Sudan,” The Project on Middle East 
Political Science (POMEPS), Elliot School of International Affairs (Washington, DC, 2020): <https://pomeps.org/ 
the-great-game-of-the-uae-and-saudi-arabia-in-sudan> (accessed June23, 2020).
3  International Crisis Group, Intra-Gulf Competition in Africa’s Horn: Lessening the Impact  
(Brussels, September 19, 2019).
AN OPPORTUNITY FOR 
SUSTAINABLE PEACE 
AND LONG-TERM 
TRANSFORMATION
So far, Sudan’s transition is a most­
ly positive story. In its neighborhood, 
it stands in marked contrast to Libya, 
Yemen, and Egypt, which also expe ri­
enced transition processes in the past 
decade after protests led to regime 
change. Like them, Sudan is a focal 
point for the overarching rivalry be­
tween governments supporting certain 
Islamist actors in the region (Turkey, 
Qatar, and Iran) and those opposing 
them (UAE, Saudi Arabia, and Egypt).3 
In Sudan, however, neither has regional 
and local power competition descend­
ed into a proxy war, nor have security 
forces taken over full control and rees­
tablished authoritarian rule – yet. 
Supporting Sudan’s transition process 
has become one of the most high­pro­
file issues in Germany’s Africa policy. 
Three main reasons explain this en ­ 
gagement.
First, Germany recognizes the oppor­
tunity that the transition process rep­
resents to turn the page on decades of 
repression, civil wars, and support to 
international terrorism. Consequently, 
Germany has provided mediation sup­
port to peace in Sudan for several 
years. Sudan’s transition process has a 
chance to exemplify how representa­
tives of a former regime and advocates 
for democratic change can join forces 
with international partners to chart 
a path toward sustainable peace and 
the long­term transformation of state­ 
society relations. 
Second, Germany’s Sudan diplomacy 
is an expression of a recent trend in 
which policymakers have started to 
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marshal Germany’s political capital 
in the service of its growing work on 
peace promotion, crisis prevention, 
and stabilization.4 The Normandy 
Format on Ukraine (with Germany, 
France, Ukraine, and Russia) and the 
Berlin Process on Libya are high­ 
level examples of this trend. German 
policy makers are, however, still on 
a steep learning curve. They struggle 
to deal with transactional power pol­
itics, including holding their national 
and international interlocutors to 
account when they violate agreements. 
Equipping their diplomatic efforts 
with sufficient staff and resources has 
also been an issue for Germany. None­
theless, these initiatives represent a 
greater propensity to take risks – and 
oft­cited civilian “responsibility” – in 
world politics.
Third, Germany’s role in Sudan reflects 
the growing role of middle powers in 
a changing world order and height­
ened expectations for Europe’s largest 
economy in international affairs. With 
the US retreating from its traditional 
role of power broker in the Middle 
East and Africa, China and India em­
bracing a narrow focus on state sover­
eignty, and the UK engulfed by Brexit, 
Europe needs to step into the fray. 
Given Africa’s economic growth, inno­
vation, resources, multilateral engage­
ment, and migration patterns, stability 
in Europe’s neighboring continent is in 
its own interest. 
The German government also faces 
high domestic expectations to deliver 
tangible successes as a result of its 
diplomatic leadership. In February 
2020, the German Bundestag called on 
the German government to support 
4  Die Bundesregierung, Guidelines on Preventing Crises, Resolving Conflicts, Building Peace (Berlin, 2017).
5  Deutscher Bundestag, Transformationsprozess im Sudan Unterstützen – Wiederaufnahme und Ausbau der bilateralen politischen, wirtschaftlichen und entwicklungs-
politischen Zusammenarbeit mit dem Sudan, Drucksache 19/17118 [Support Transformation Process in Sudan – Resumption and Expansion of Bilateral Political, Economic,  
and Development Cooperation with Sudan] (Berlin, 2020).
6  “Inflation over 114% as Sudan’s economic woes deepen,” Radio Dabanga, June 18, 2020: <https://www.dabangasudan.org/en/all-news/article/inflation-over-114-as- 
sudan-s-economic-woes-deepen> (accessed June 23, 2020).
7  Famine Early Warning Systems Network, “Continuing COVID-19 Measures Drive Atypically High Needs Leading into the Lean Season,” May 2020: <https://fews.net/ 
east-africa/sudan/key-message-update/may-2020> (accessed June 23, 2020).
8  IMF, Sudan 2019 Article IV Consultation Staff Report (Washington, DC, March 2020).
9  IMF, Sudan. Selected Issues (Washington, DC, March 2020), p. 8.
10  “Inflation over 114% as Sudan’s economic woes deepen,” Radio Dabanga, June 18, 2020: <https://www.dabangasudan.org/en/all-news/article/inflation-over-114-as- 
sudan-s-economic-woes-deepen> (accessed June 23, 2020).
Sudan’s transition process.5 Two rival 
draft resolutions by the opposition 
groups of the Greens and the Left Party 
underscored the high parliamentary 
attention on Germany’s engagement in 
Sudan. 
Peace and stability in Sudan will re­
quire a successful transition process 
toward democratic elections, inclu­
sive economic growth, the establish­
ment of representative institutions, 
accountability for past crimes, and the 
reconciliation of relations between 
communities and the state in the cen­
ter and periphery. These aims were 
agreed upon by the military junta and 
the FFC in the constitutional declara­
tion that they signed in August 2019. 
The document, which functions as 
Sudan’s interim constitution, estab­
lished the 39­month transition period 
that is supposed to end with demo­
cratic elections.
The key challenges for Germany and 
its European partners in supporting 
these aims are the stabilization of the 
economy, keeping spoilers in Sudan 
and the region at bay, and broadening 
the basis of the Friends of Sudan, the 
main forum of international coopera­
tion. An impending new international 
partnership with Sudan needs to ad­
dress these issues. 
WHY SUDAN URGENTLY 
NEEDS INTERNATIONAL 
ECONOMIC SUPPORT
Today, Sudan’s transitional government 
faces an economic crisis on sever­
al levels. Inflation is over one hundred 
percent,6 pushing an already vulner­
able population deeper into poverty 
and food insecurity. Food prices have 
doubled from May 2019 to 2020.7 Su­
dan is in arrears with the International 
Financial Institutions (IFIs) and unable 
to pay back $54.5 billion in debt accu­
mulated over the past decades. Almost 
two thirds of the government’s tiny 
revenues were spent on economic 
subsidies in 2019, according to IMF 
estimates.8 Around 60 percent of the 
economy takes place in the informal 
sector outside the reach of govern­
ment taxes.9 The government main­
tains multiple exchange rates of the 
Sudanese pound (SDG) to the US dollar 
(USD); the central bank’s official rate 
differs markedly from the parallel 
exchange rate, which covers 80 percent 
of all transactions.
The cabinet is currently fighting on a 
daily basis to maintain essential import 
shipments, scraping together every 
hard currency it can get its hands on. 
It finds itself in this difficult position 
because of a vicious cycle governing 
Sudan’s economy (Figure 1). Fuel prices 
are fixed in SDG terms, but fuel im­
ports are paid in USD. The government 
has maintained fuel prices at some of 
the lowest levels in the world, leading 
to large fiscal deficits. To fund these 
deficits, the government has resorted 
to monetization, i.e. “printing money” 
(raising the money supply). The greater 
supply of SDGs has pushed up in­
flation as well as the exchange rate. 
The parallel exchange rate has fallen 
from 47 SDG/USD in December 2018 
to 146 SDG/USD in June 2020.10 As the 
SDG has depreciated, the amount of 
hard currency needed to finance the 
fuel subsidy has increased in turn. This 
spending has pushed up expenditure 
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and enlarged the deficit.11 As import 
prices soar, the central bank struggles 
to find enough hard currency to facili­
tate trade operations. 
This economic instability is a signifi­
cant threat to Sudan’s transition pro­
cess. Rising bread prices ignited the 
protests that started in December 
2018 and quickly evolved into general 
anti­government demonstrations. The 
ongoing economic crisis also risks 
undermining domestic support for the 
transitional government.
11  IMF, Sudan 2019 Article IV Consultation Staff Report, p. 7.
12  Alex de Waal, Sudan: A Political Marketplace Framework Analysis, World Peace Foundation, Occasional Paper  
No. 19, August 2019.
A Legacy of the Former Regime’s 
Political Business Model
Sudan’s current economic woes are a 
direct result of Bashir’s political busi­
ness model.12 Bashir’s government 
neglected the development of agri­
culture and other productive sectors. 
Instead, it lived off sprawling oil 
revenues for the first decade of the 
21st century, which created significant 
economic growth. These oil revenues 
allowed Bashir to buy off political rivals 
and pacify large sections of the urban 
population through generous subsidies 
for fuel, wheat, electricity, and medi­
cines, most of which were imported.
Bashir’s political business model came 
under threat when the economic sit­
uation changed drastically. After the 
secession of South Sudan in July 2011, 
Sudan lost three quarters of its oil 
production, two thirds of its exports 
(Figure 2), and half its public revenue 
sources. Sudan was able to compen­
sate some of the losses through gold 
mining that took off around the same 
time. However, even if gold exports 
quickly became Sudan’s most import­
ant source of foreign currency, large 
amounts were smuggled. By 2018, the 
remaining gold exports delivered less 
than a tenth of former revenues from 
oil exports. Moreover, the government 
bought the gold from the mines at 
above market price to prevent smug­
gling – a strategy that also added to 
the inflationary pressure created by 
the economic subsidies. In the end, the 
government was unable to maintain 
this system. In late 2018, it started to 
lift the subsidies. When bread became 
more expensive and scarcer due to 
import difficulties, it provided a spark 
for long­simmering discontent to 
break out into open protests.
Figure 1: Vicious cycle of deficit monetization and  
fuel subsidies fixed in SDG
Source: Author’s own compilation
Fiscal deficit Monetization
Fuel subsidy  
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Momentum and Challenges  
in Domestic Reforms
Securing international assistance to 
ameliorate this crisis has been a key 
deliverable for the civilian­led cabinet 
from the start. Prime Minister Abdallah 
Hamdok and Finance Minister Ibrahim 
Badawi, who both had previous careers 
in international organizations, called 
for $10 billion in support in their first 
weeks in office. But international part­
ners first wanted assurances that cru­
cial reforms were on their way and 
had the buy­in of the transition’s main 
stakeholders. The IMF and donors in­
sisted that mitigation measures had 
to be in place before subsidies were 
removed.13 
13  IMF, Sudan 2019 Article IV Consultation Staff Report, p. 15.
Lifting the subsidies has, however, been 
politically contentious in Khartoum. 
In December 2019, Finance Minister 
Badawi had to withdraw an initial pro­
posal for phasing out the fuel subsidies 
after facing protests by the FFC. Fear­
ing rising prices, FFC representatives 
instead pointed to the large amount 
of spending in the security sector and 
revenues of companies controlled by 
that sector. A national economic con­
ference to resolve these differences 
that was scheduled for late March 2020 
had to be postponed due to the arrival 
of COVID­19. 
At the same time, economic pressure 
resulting from the restrictions intro­
duced to suppress the coronavirus 
pandemic spurred on reform decisions 
by the Sudanese government. The 
government restricted subsidized 
fuel to few outlets, despite previous 
resistance from the FFC. This forced 
fuel stations to sell benzine and diesel 
at non­subsidized rates. The govern­
ment abolished customs exemptions, 
which used to be a major loophole in 
its revenue stream. It also announced 
new regulation of the gold trade to 
combat smuggling. Hundreds of com­
panies owned by the security sector 
are slated to be privatized, transferred 
to civilian state control, or dissolved. 
A commission to investigate holdings 
by members of the former regime has 
announced asset seizures that it priced 
at $4 billion. 
Figure 2: Sudanese exports 2005–2018 (Current gross export)
Source: The Atlas for Economic Complexity, Harvard University
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The necessary adjustments to stabi­
lize the Sudanese economy will cre­
ate short­term hardships as prices of 
transport, domestic production (reliant 
on diesel generators), and daily goods 
will soar. As mitigation measures, 
the government announced a hike of 
civil service salaries by an average of 
569 percent. In addition, it introduced 
a temporary cash­transfer system that 
is ultimately supposed to reach 80 per­
cent of Sudan’s population, providing 
500 SDG per person per month (cur­
rently 3 to 4 USD), payable in quarterly 
installments to each family. This “Sudan 
Family Support Programme” (SFSP) will 
cost $1.9 billion per year and last for up 
to two years. The World Bank, IMF, and 
World Food Programme have provided 
technical assistance in the past few 
months to develop the distribution sys­
tem and set up a multi­donor trust fund 
to support it.
Rolling out the SFSP faces major chal­
lenges. Ten million potential beneficia­
ries still need to be registered, many 
in remote and conflict-affected areas 
where trust between the government 
and communities is low. Given the 
pressure on aid budgets worldwide 
because of the COVID­19 pandemic, 
collecting sufficient external fund­
ing is difficult. Communication efforts 
need to be revamped to explain to the 
population that the program, while 
temporary, will lay the groundwork 
for the expansion of a long­term social 
safety net.14 
14  World Bank, Sudan Family Support Programme, Concept Environmental and Social Review Summary Concept 
Stage (Washington, DC, April 24, 2020).
15  Gallopin, “The Great Game of the UAE and Saudi Arabia in Sudan” (see note 2).
16  Jean-Baptiste Gallopin, Bad Company: How Dark Money Threatens Sudan’s Transition, European Council on 
Foreign Relations, June 9, 2020, pp. 12–16.
17  Mohammed Amin, “‘Playing with Fire’: Sudan Revolution in Peril as Splits Appear among Its Protagonists,”  
Middle East Eye, May 19, 2020: <https://www.middleeasteye.net/news/playing-fire-sudan-revolution-peril-splits-
appear-among-its-protagonists> (accessed June 23, 2020).
KEEPING SPOILERS AT BAY
Despite recent progress on economic 
reforms, the government remains un­
der the immense risk of falling apart. 
The members of the broad domestic 
and international coalition currently 
supporting Sudan’s transition have 
widely differing understandings of sta­
bility. For Prime Minister Hamdok and 
leading countries in the Friends of 
Sudan such as Germany, the situation 
requires careful management of com­
peting power centers in a context of 
transactional elite bargaining – neither 
of which they are used to. In contrast, 
Arab powers such as the UAE, Egypt, 
and Saudi Arabia, are providing finan­
cial and diplomatic support to mili­
tary and security forces, their preferred 
interlocutors in Sudan.15
The transitional government has been 
plagued by fragmentation and a fragile 
balance of power, both between ci­
vilians and security services as well 
as among each of them individually.16 
The Umma Party, which was in power 
during Sudan’s last civilian govern­
ment in the late 1980s, left the FFC 
in May 2020. It has also repeatedly 
called for early elections before the 
end of the 39­month transition period. 
The Sudanese Professionals Associ­
ation, a key member of the FFC and 
crucial actor during the revolutionary 
protests in 2019, has been taken over by 
the far left (Sudan’s Communist Party).17 
While initially endowed with enormous 
political capital, Hamdok’s civilian 
cabinet and the FFC have lost signifi­
cant political support. Furthermore, 
the government and the FFC have not 
been able to agree on the appointment 
of civilian governors and the transi­
An International Partnership for Sudan’s Transition
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tional legislative council, the interim 
parliament. This body could play an 
important role in holding the transi­
tional government to account. Increas­
ingly frustrated with the slow pace of 
the reforms, the resistance commit­
tees – the grassroots movements at 
the core of the revolution – are losing 
patience. They have announced plans 
for a large demonstration on June 30, 
2020, one year after the “march of mil­
lions” that was a turning point in nego­
tiations with the security sector.
While the cabinet is losing influence, 
security forces are gaining ground. The 
Sudanese Armed Forces (SFAF) and the 
paramilitary Rapid Support Forces 
(RSF) have maintained massive sway 
over the economy. Lt. General Fattah 
Abdel al­Burhan is head of the Sover­
eign Council, the collective presidency 
made up of five members of the secu­
rity sector and six civilians that shares 
power with the mainly civilian cabinet. 
Burhan and Lt. General Mohammed 
Hamdan Daglo, known as Hemeti, the 
leader of the RSF, present themselves 
as defenders of the revolution and 
friends of democracy. But their close 
association with Former President 
Bashir and atrocities in the Western 
region of Darfur, as well as their insis­
tence on a narrow view of state sover­
eignty, throw these claims into doubt. 
For example, the generals opposed a 
strong mandate on human rights mon­
itoring and the protection of civilians 
for the newly created UN Integrated 
Transition Assistance Mission in Sudan 
(UNITAMS) and lobbied for a timely 
withdrawal of the AU/UN hybrid op­
eration in Darfur (UNAMID). In the UN 
Security Council, Russia, China, and 
the three African members supported 
their position.18
18  “Resolutions on the UN/AU Hybrid Operation in Darfur (UNAMID) and the Establishment of a Follow-on Mission,” 
What’s in Blue, June 3, 2020: <https://www.whatsinblue.org/2020/06/resolutions-on-the-un-au-hybrid-operation-
in-darfur-unamid-and-the-establishment-of-a-follow-on-mission.php> (accessed June 23, 2020).
Despite the allegations against him, 
RSF leader Hemeti has made himself 
indispensable in Sudan’s current dis­
pensation. He is the deputy head of 
the Sovereign Council and chairs the 
main joint economic committee of the 
Sovereign Council, the cabinet, and the 
FFC. He has personally injected cash in­
to the central bank, handles relations 
with the UAE and other Arab powers 
with massive financial interests in 
Sudan, and plays a central role in peace 
negotiations with armed groups in Juba, 
the capital of South Sudan.
Germany and other European coun­
tries still struggle to find a modus ope­
randi with Hemeti and the generals as 
well as their Arab backers. The Euro­
peans’ own record is mixed; while the 
EU abhorred the human rights viola­
tions by Bashir’s regime, it sought its 
cooperation on curbing illegal migra­
tion and people smuggling after 2015.
THE FRIENDS OF 
SUDAN: A MORE 
INCLUSIVE FORMAT
The Friends of Sudan have become 
the most important international 
forum for Sudan’s transition process. 
They bring together both Western 
and Gulf countries with the govern­
ment of Sudan in a regular diplomatic 
exchange to monitor the progress of 
the transition. 
Germany played a leading role in con­
vening the group. When the pro­
tests in Sudan persisted in early 2019, 
the German government called on 
an informal contact group that had 
monitored a mediation process with 
Darfuri armed groups sponsored by 
An International Partnership for Sudan’s Transition
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the German government. The mem­
bers of this initial group were the US, 
France, UK, Norway, Germany, and EU. 
A first informal meeting of this group 
took place in Berlin in March 2019, 
followed by a similar meeting on 
May 18, 2019, in Washington, DC, con­
vened by the United States. A month 
later, the German government hosted 
the group for the first time togeth­
er with the UAE, Saudi Arabia, Qatar, 
Egypt, Ethiopia, and AU in Berlin.19
The main advantages of the Friends 
of Sudan are their flexibility and rela­
tively broad and growing membership. 
The group exchanges views frequently 
in a small steering group format, in­
cluding the founding members and 
the United Nations, and meets every 
few months with all members. These 
formats allow for a degree of cohesion 
and like­mindedness in the steering 
group while coopting potential spoil­
ers and smaller actors in the larger 
format. Bringing together key stake­
holders with influence on the parties 
on the ground, in particular the Gulf 
countries close to the security sector, 
is a key benefit of the Friends of Sudan 
compared with more established for­
mats – including the Troika of the US, 
UK, and Norway – which have coordi­
nated policy on Sudan and South Sudan 
since negotiations on the Comprehen­
sive Peace Agreement on Sudan began 
in the early 2000s. Furthermore, the 
Friends of Sudan are also nimbler and 
less affected by polarization than the 
UN Security Council, which mandates 
and controls the UN peace operations 
in Sudan.
The same features – its membership 
and informality – also limit the ef­
fectiveness of the Friends of Sudan. 
Since the transitional government was 
formed, civilian members of the cabi­
net have participated regularly. How­
ever, there is no formalized exchange 
19  “Außenminister Maas zum informellen Koordinierungs-Treffen zu Sudan” [Foreign Minister Maas on the Informal 
Coordination Meeting on Sudan], Auswärtiges Amt, June 21, 2019: <https://www.auswaertiges-amt.de/de/
newsroom/maas-informelles-koordinierungstreffen-sudan/2228712> (accessed June 23, 2020).
with the other Sudanese stakeholders 
in this format, in particular with the 
FFC as well as civil society actors not 
represented by the FFC. Furthermore, 
the statements made by the Friends 
of Sudan are mere chair summa­
ries and have no binding character on 
all members. With the rotating chair 
between meetings and the lack of 
a support structure, it is difficult to 
ensure a consistent follow­up.
FORMING AN 
INTERNATIONAL 
PARTNERSHIP 
WITH SUDAN
Now is the time to give the interna­
tional partnership with Sudan a more 
solid foundation. Many pieces that the 
Friends of Sudan and the transitional 
government have been working on for 
the past months are falling into place. 
The Family Support Programme is 
being rolled out, if only as a small pilot. 
In May, the Friends of Sudan and the 
government agreed on a “mutual part­
nership framework” with principles of 
financial accountability, transparency, 
efficiency, and a commitment to the 
constitutional declaration. The IMF 
has begun negotiating a staff­moni­
tored program, a first step in building 
a track record toward debt relief. The 
World Bank is preparing pre­arrears 
clearance grants to accelerate Sudan’s 
access to funds from IFIs. Finally, the 
United States is moving closer to re­
moving Sudan from their list of state 
sponsors of terrorism as the transi­
tional government is about to agree on 
financial settlements with the victims 
of terror attacks in which the previous 
regime had been implicated. 
If the new partnership with Sudan is to 
be meaningful, Germany and the other 
partners should heed the following 
recommendations:
THE FRIENDS 
OF SUDAN 
Members 
African Development Bank, 
African Union, Canada, Egypt, 
Ethiopia, European Union, 
France, Germany, International 
Monetary Fund, Italy, Japan, 
Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, 
Kuwait, League of Arab States, 
Netherlands, Norway, Qatar, 
Spain, Sudan, Sweden, United 
Arab Emirates, United King-
dom, United Nations, United 
States, and World Bank
Official Meetings 
May 18, 2019: Washington, DC  
June 21, 2019: Berlin  
July 22, 2019: Brussels 
October 22, 2019: Washington, DC 
December 11, 2019: Khartoum 
February 18, 2020: Stockholm 
May 7, 2020: Paris (virtual)
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1. Mobilize enough funds to roll out 
the SFSP as planned. 
Despite its small individual amounts, 
the SFSP will bring tangible dividends 
to large sections of the population. 
This will strengthen the civilian part of 
the government and help them move 
forward with their reforms to halt the 
downward economic spiral. If European 
countries manage to pledge substan­
tial aid money on their own, their influ­
ence in Sudanese politics may also rise 
in relation to the Gulf countries that 
pledged large sums to the transition to 
prop up the security sector. 
2. Adopt a holistic approach to  
funding and transition support. 
Sudan needs many different kinds of 
support, all of which have their own 
governance mechanisms and condi­
tions attached. The partners need to 
ensure that their contributions to hu­
manitarian aid, bilateral development 
cooperation, aid related to COVID­19, 
peacebuilding, and macroeconomic 
stabilization through the IFIs are trans­
parent and mutually reinforcing. Build­
ing on current discussions concerning 
the “triple nexus” among humanitar­
ian, development, and peacebuilding 
work, Sudan’s partners need to foster 
resilience, focus on the causes of pov­
erty and conflict (for example land 
rights and environmental degradation), 
and help the transitional authorities 
ramp up their own governance capaci­
ties. The new UN mission UNITAMS will 
have an important role in this regard.
3. Make support conditional on  
the timely implementation of the 
constitutional declaration. 
Sudan’s international partners need to 
make it crystal clear that any unilateral 
abrogation of the constitutional decla­
ration, for example through a military 
takeover, would pose a serious risk to 
the international partnership. It seems 
that even the UAE and Saudi Arabia, 
early supporters of the military coup 
in April 2019, recognize that their eco­
nomic investments will only be secure 
if Sudan receives coordinated inter­
national assistance, regains access to 
financial markets, and maintains polit­
ical stability. Their economic interests 
thus depend on the successful com­
pletion of the macroeconomic reforms, 
support from IFIs, and broader pledges 
to the SFSP. 
4. Expand the participation of Suda-
nese civil society and peripheries. 
Given the transitional government’s 
deteriorating domestic legitimacy, 
the Friends of Sudan should increase 
their consultations with all facets of 
Sudanese civil society on a regular 
basis. Establishing a civil society forum 
that meets in parallel to the Friends 
of Sudan, with representatives from 
Sudan and the Friends’ member states, 
could be a viable approach, maybe ini­
tially in a virtual format. Special consid­
eration should be given to women and 
youth groups as well as representatives 
from Sudan’s many peripheries.
CONCLUSION
The Sudan partnership conference on 
June 25, co-hosted by Germany, the EU, 
UN, and Sudan, has the chance to pro-
vide new momentum to Sudan’s tran-
sition process. Every six months or 
so, follow-up conferences will provide 
opportunities to take stock of the prog-
ress made in implementing the objec-
tives of the constitutional declaration 
and the promises of the international 
partners, as well as mobilizing further 
financial resources. If they manage to 
abide by their ambitious plans, Sudan’s 
partners and stakeholders can respond 
to the courage of the Sudanese that 
toppled an entrenched dictatorship
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